The Policy of the United States

Editor’s note: This story from 1915 contains dated language that is no longer used today. In the interest of keeping a historical record, it appears here as it was originally published.

The people of the United States are singularly lacking in information concerning both the military history of their country and its military policy. Students in school and college as a rule receive entirely erroneous ideas on both of these subjects. The average young man, unless he has really made a study of the country’s history, is firmly convinced that the Revolutionary War was characterized throughout by the highest quality of patriotism and devotion to the best interests of the country on the part of the people as a whole. He is not at all familiar with the desperate struggle which was made by Washington, various Colonial assemblies and the Confederation of Colonies, to keep in the field even a small force of troops. He hears very little of the bickerings, mutinies, desertions and frequent changes of personnel which made the war a difficult one to conduct and served to bring out into strong relief the remarkable qualities of Washington — those qualities of patience, good judgment, discretion, and again patience, and more patience, which made it possible for him to hold the illy equipped, disjointed and discordant elements together, and to have always available some kind of a fighting force, although seldom an effective one. We have as a nation neglected the lessons of past wars, and have learned little from the example of the great military nations, and, as Emory Upton truthfully says: “Our general policy has followed closely that of China.” Perhaps this statement may be somewhat extreme in all which applies to conditions up to the end of the Civil War, but it is not in any ways extreme when applied to conditions which exist today. The great nations with policies to uphold and interests to defend have made what they believe to be adequate military preparation.

The Meaning of Military Preparedness

The United States has been drifting for years. No real military preparations of an adequate character have been made. Military preparedness means the organization of all the resources of a nation — men, material and money — so that the full power of the nation may be promptly applied and continued at maximum strength for a considerable period of time. War today, when initiated by a country prepared for war, comes with great suddenness, because all preparations have been made in advance; plans have been worked out to the last detail, organization completed and reserve supplies purchased and assembled long in advance, and the whole force of the mighty machine can be applied in a very brief period of time at any designated point. Back of the machine itself is the railroad service, so organized as to be turned over immediately to the military authorities. Back of this come the civil hospitals, the bakeries, and the supply departments of all sorts, each with its responsibility fixed in case of operations within its area, or in case of a demand for supplies in other sections of the theatre of war. The capacity of every ship is known, and plans completed for her use as a troop ship, and when war threatens, the whereabouts of the shipping is closely watched, and ships are assembled quietly to meet any demand which may be required for oversea operations. These are but an outline of what is meant by military preparedness. Mere numbers of men and undeveloped military resources are of little value. It has been well said that in the sudden onrush of modern war, undeveloped military resources are of no more use than an undeveloped golf mine in Alaska would be in a panic on Wall Street. The comparison is not overdrawn. You must remember, all of you, that this country has never yet engaged in war with a first-class power prepared for war. 

           You must remember also that once sea power is lost or held in check an enormous force can be landed on these shores within a month — a force sufficient to go where it will and to hold whatever it desires to hold.

           Why have we failed to make adequate preparation? Partly because of ignorance of the true facts concerning our utter unpreparedness, and partly due to a conceit fostered by the average 4^th of July orator and politician, through statements to the effect that we possess peculiar and remarkable military characteristics which make our soldiers trained and efficient without preparation, and as good as equally brace and equally sound men of other countries who have spent years in training. Again there is the curious Anglo-Saxon prejudice against a large standing army and the feeling that it is always a menace to civil liberty. In our past wars we were not confronted by great nations with highly organized military machines; steam navigation had not appeared; our possible enemies were without standing armies of any size, and lacked entirely that complete military organization which characterized them today. It took a long time to get troops together and prepare supplies for them, and a considerable period of time to cross the ocean. Our fore-fathers had more time to prepare. Then, again, they were more familiar with the use of arms; weapons were of a simple type; they could be made quickly, and instruction in their use was a relatively simple matter. Now highly organized military establishments are the rule among our possible antagonists. Rapid steam transportation in vast amount is available. The arms of war are extremely complicated and costly; it takes a long time to make them and a long time to instruct soldiers in their use. In other words, today everything is in favor of the prepared aggressor, and everything against the unready pacific nation.

           The blow comes more quickly and with greater force, and it is not possible to provide even a semblance of protection against it unless wise measures have been taken long in advance.

           Since the foundation of the Republic, war has existed as follows:

Revolutionary War…………………………….7 years

War of 1812-1814…………………………..2 ½ years

Mexican War…………………………….…….2 years

Florida War……………………………….……7 years

Civil War……………………………………....4 years

War with Spain and Philippine Rebellion……..2 years

Not to mention numerous Indian wars and internal disturbances requiring the use of troops.

           We have struggled through these wars and have emerged generally successfully, but in none of them has there been any evidence of well-thought-out preparations or the application of a sound military policy. Our people remember only the success and forget entirely the great and unnecessary cost in blood and treasure in which our defective method of conducting these wars resulted. By faulty methods I mean that we have generally conducted war as a confederacy instead of as a nation. We have permitted altogether too much interference by States. Too many officers have been appointed by the Governors of States. New regiments have been raised oftentimes in order that new officers might be appointed and political patronage increased, whereas the old regiments should have been filled up, as they had acquired experience, some traditions and esprit, and were much more valuable than new regiments. This is seen in the Civil War in case of the Wisconsin organizations. Wisconsin had the good sense to veteranize her regiments, and the result is seen when one remembers the term “Iron Brigade” applied to a Wisconsin brigade.

           Then again we have had frequently the intervention of civilians, either through the activities of the Secretary of War or of the civil arm of the Government. There has been a general lack of a sense of individual responsibility for military service. Reliance on volunteer enlistments has continued, and has been one of the gravest sources of danger to the Republic. The experience of the Revolution should have taught us that it is not safe in a real war to depend upon volunteers. There is an enthusiastic response by a certain proportion of the best element in the early days of war, but this response cannot be counted upon to continue throughout a long war involving severe strains upon the population, nor is it right or just to throw the burden of military service upon a portion of the population. It is a universal obligation and the country will never be secure of safe until it is recognized as such and measures are taken to develop military preparation on a basis of universal military obligation.

Mistakes of the Revolution

To return to the Revolution, in 1774 Massachusetts Colony assembled a provisional congress, and began preparations for a conflict with Great Britain. It took steps to organize a militia and to appoint officers. The movement was continued through the year 1775, and provision was made that a portion of the militia should be Minute Men — men who would hold themselves ready to respond immediately to call. This was the condition when the fight at Lexington occurred. Men were commissioned as officers largely in accordance with the number of men they raised. It was a most vicious practice, and one which has persisted until recent times. Popular men, regardless of their military qualifications or fitness, were appointed to commands which they were entirely unfitted to exercise.

           In May, 1775, the Continental Congress met (this was about three weeks after the battle of Lexington). It assumed immediately the functions of civil government, but being without authority to levy taxes or to raise revenue, it was empowered to emit bills of credit, their redemption being secured by the promise of the twelve Colonies. This limitation upon its financial power almost neutralized its power to create and support armies. The conduct of the Revolutionary War would have been very different had the Continental Congress had the power to employ the entire financial and military resources of the people. This Congress authorized the formation of ten companies of riflemen, and these companies were really the beginning of the Continental Army. They were raised from Pennsylvania, Virginia and Maryland. The term of enlistment was fixed at one year. There was great enthusiasm, and the twelve companies reported within sixty days. As was natural the men composing these companies were among the best. The really best men are those who first rush to the colors.

           These riflemen were the nucleus of the army which finally achieved our independence, and maintained a high reputation throughout the war. The term of enlistment, however, was short, and here we encounter one of the great difficulties which confronted Washington and all others throughout the Revolution; namely, the question of short enlistments. Men were barely trained before they left the service to be replaced by others untrained and, of course, unequipped and generally demanding new uniforms and equipment. Shortly after the authorization of these companies of riflemen Congress authorized twenty-six additional regiments to be raised by the different colonies — 16 by Massachusetts. Blank commissions were sent to Washington. With the arrival of these blank commissions Washington’s troubles and difficulties were greatly augmented. A tremendous struggle followed. States attempted to secure an undue proportion for their own contingents.

           Washington’s letters at this time speak of corruption, lack of patriotism, slow enlistments, and indicate a condition which would have appalled any but one with a stout heart and determined character.

           About this time appeared the question of “bounty” — one of the most dangerous and pernicious methods of securing men. Washington was already deeply impressed with the danger of short enlistments and the unreliability of the Militia. He was also alarmed at the general and widespread evil of desertion. Volunteering had already become slow. Washington recommended coercive measures to the General Court of Massachusetts and urged — indeed almost prayed — Congress to establish enlistments for the war. He already saw clearly that the volunteer system was a failure, that it was so full of grave dangers and that the war could not be successfully conducted by untrained men led by inefficient officers.

           It was during this year — thanks largely to the efforts of Washington — that the Continental Army reached its maximum strength — the greatest that it had during the struggle. At its maximum it totaled in round number 80,000 men, of whom 40,000 were Continentals and 42,000 Militia. Dictatorial powers were given to Washington to raise troops in any of the Colonies, seize supplies and compel acceptance of colonial bills; from all of which it is clearly evident that had we been opposed by a vigorous, well organized enemy our capacity for resistance would have been comparatively slight.

           The British campaign was not pushed with great energy. From the high water mark of 89,000 the Continental Army shrank year by year. In 1777 the total was 69,000; in 1778 it had dwindled to 51,000, and such was the condition of the difficulty as to enlistments that the enlistment of negroe slaves was authorized by Rhode Island — these slaves to become free on enlistment.

           Congress recommended to the States the employment of the draft. These conditions grew worse in 1779. Bounties had to be greatly increased and the total maximum force shrank to 44,000. In 1780 the same general difficulties continued. The proportion of Continentals to Militia had increased. The grand total was about 43,000, of whom a very considerable number were Militia enlisted for short periods. In 1781 (the last year which was characterized by active fighting), the army had dwindled to a total of a little over 29,000 men; mutiny took place among the troops of the Pennsylvania line, and the general condition was chaotic. Had we been confronted by a well organized enemy and a vigorous campaign waged against us, it is not difficult to foresee what the outcome must have been. Bounties had increased enormously, and discipline was poor among the newly raised troops.

           No one who has studied carefully the situation during the last two years of the Revolutionary War can fail to appreciate the tremendous value of the aid which was furnished us by France. It was of vital importance and came at a most critical time. The haphazard policy followed throughout the Revolution cost tremendously in life and treasure. Years after the war General Lee (known as Light Horse Harry Lee) characterized our military policy as follows:

           “While I record with delight facts which maintain our native and national courage, I feel a horror lest demagogues who flourish in a representative system of government (the best when virtue rules, the wit of man can devise) shall avail themselves of the occasional testimony to produce a great result. Convinced as I am that a government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uninformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle. I cannot withhold my denunciation of its wickedness and folly.”

           Washington’s criticism of our military policy was none the less strong. He says: 

           “Had we formed a permanent army in the beginning, which, by the continuance of the same men in service, had been capable of discipline, we should never have had to retreat with a handful of men across the Delaware in 1776 trembling for the fate of America, which nothing but the infatuation of the enemy could have saved….We should not have been the greatest part of the war inferior to the enemy, indebted for our safety to their inactivity enduring frequently the mortification of seeing inviting opportunities to ruin them pass unimproved for want of a force which the country was completely able to afford, and of seeing the country ravaged, our towns burnt, the inhabitants plundered, abused, murdered, with impunity from the same cause…There is every reason to believe that the war has been protracted on this account,” etc.

           The total number of Regulars engaged during the war was 237,731; the total Militia about 164,000 — roughly a total of 395,000 troops. Our maximum was in 1776, when we had 89,000, and it dwindled to a little over 29,000 in 1781. In 1776 the British had 20,171, and in 1781 they had 42,000. In other words, Great Britain, sluggishly as she conducted the war, was nevertheless growing stronger, and had it not been for the invaluable assistance of France, it is not improbable that the war might have gone against us.

           Our people soon forgot the lessons of this war, remembering only that we came out of it successfully. The war was rendered unnecessarily long and expensive, both in men and money, by the total lack of experience of our statesmen in military matters. Our efficiency was undermined by short enlistments and the failure to recognize the danger of dependence on Volunteers; also by ignorance of the fact that the bounty cannot be depended upon in a long war and failure to appreciate the fact that troops are reliable only when they are commanded by well trained officers who have at least received reasonable training and discipline. 

           Shortly after the close of the war the Army was practically disbanded, except Battery F (known as the “Alexander Hamilton Battery”). This battery has continued in our service since the Revolution, and is now Battery F of the 4^th Artillery.

           Little was apparently learned from the Revolution.

The “Nation in Arms” Idea

There were reorganizations of the Army in 1790, 1791 and 1792, which resulted finally in an army of 5,500 men. The whole policy, however, was rather haphazard. There was no system worthy of the name for increasing the Army, and no reserve of trained officers; in fact, the mistakes of the Revolution had apparently been forgotten.

           In 1792 Baron Steuben, who had been of great value to the Colonies as an organizer and instructor of troops, recommended that the Army be organized as a legion, and the Secretary of War (Gen. Knox) was so impressed with the idea that he proposed to apply the same organization to eh Militia, dividing it into three bodies, designated as the Advanced, Main and Reserve corps — first, the Advance Corps, to consist of men from 18 to 20 years of age, inclusive — second, the Main Corps, consisting of men from 21 to 45 years of age, inclusive — third, all men from 45 to 60 years of age, inclusive. All members of the Advance Corps under 20 were to receive military instruction for 30 days at annual camps.

           Other young men of the Advance Corps were required to be present at least ten days of these encampments. The members of the Main Corps were to receive four days’ instructions per year.

           Here we find many years in advance of its application in Europe the idea of a nation in arms; in other words, an endorsement of the policy recommended by Jefferson; namely, that we must classify and train all our male citizens. In fact, as one studies the papers of the early Presidents, it is evident everywhere that they had in mind the “nation in arms” idea when they spoke of “our main reliance being the Militia,” the Militia including, as it did, all men between the ages of 18 and 45. It was the clear intent of the founders of the Republic that all our citizens from 18 to 45 should be trained to such an extent as to make them efficient soldiers.

           The legionary organization was adopted for the Army itself, but was never extended to the Militia, nor were the classification and training put in operation. 

           From the small size and rather temporary character of the regular military establishment, it is plain that the intention was to depend principally upon a trained Militia, and had this idea been put in operation through an effective system of training, we should have been far better prepared for our subsequent wars, and eventually have adopted a sound military policy, characterized by an appreciation of the necessity of training men and preparing reserves of men and material in advance. 

           From 1792 reorganizations and shake-ups in the Army continued. The year 1805 was signalized by a very important event in our military history; namely, the establishment at West Point, which was done principally on the recommendation of Alexander Hamilton.

Haphazard Policy Continued in War of 1812

In 1812 the Army was increased in view of the coming war with England. At the commencement of this war the Army consisted of 6,744 men. It was increased in June to 25 regiments of Infantry, four of Artillery, two of Dragoons and one of Riflemen — a total of 36,700. It was proposed to raise 30,000 Volunteers. 

           The war with England began on June 18, 1812. The enemy had a relatively small force of regular troops in Canada — about 4,500 effectives. Our standing army was a little less than 7,000 men. The same old haphazard policy which had characterized the conduct of military matters in the Revolution was continued. Officers who could raise men were given commissions. The Governors of some of the States refused to furnish Militia. The difficulties of a confederacy in conducting effective military operations were illustrated. Again the Militia demonstrated its entire unreliability. This war, from the standpoint of military inefficiency, was the least creditable of our wars; in fact, taken as a whole, it was highly discreditable to us on land, and while we had many brilliant individual ship actions at sea, at the end of the war our Navy was practically under blockade, and our commerce almost destroyed.

           On land, with the exception of a minor victory on the Thames, and a creditable action at Lundy’s Lane, where the Regulars covered themselves with glory, and the victory at New Orleans (fought after the war), our military operations cannot be regarded with any degree of satisfaction. IN a word, they were discreditable to us. Washington was captured by a force much less in numbers than that of the defenders — with a loss on our side of only eight killed and eleven wounded. 

           We put into this year 527,000 men. Of this number approximately 33,481 were officers. The largest number of British regular troops which were on the continent at any one time during this war was approximately 16,800. In co-operation with them were some thousands of Militia and Indians. These, however, constituted a very small force in comparison with the number which we put into the field. 

           These figures bring out very forcibly the necessity of training a large body of officers in advance of war. Especially is this important if we are to depend in any way upon Volunteers.

           The lessons of the war are so clear that it seems hardly necessary to state that it was a repetition in the gravest form of many of the blunders of the Revolution, which had only too often their origin in defective military legislation and lack of preparation, making it possible, as Upton puts it, that “less than 5,000 men for a period of two years brought war and devastation into our territory and successfully withstood the misapplied power of seven millions of people.”

           Shortly after the war the Army was reduced to 10,000. In 1817 came the Seminole war and the same haphazard policy through enlistments of many different men. New arms, new equipments, waste of money and waste of life — the same policy runs through the Indian wars in which we were engaged in subsequent years.

Indian and Mexican Wars

           Seminole and Creek Wars. During these wars relatively enormous forces of troops were employed in comparison with the small force of Indians who opposed us. The cost in blood, life and treasure was unnecessarily great. The whole conduct of the war spelt poor organization and lack of intelligent military policy. 

           In 1838 the Army was increased to about 12,500. In 1842 it was again reduced to 8,600. In 1846 the rumble of the approaching Mexican war was heard, and there was a gradual increase in the Army. During that war it was increased to about 39,000 Regulars. At the end of the war it was again reduced to 10,300. There was a serious effort made during this war to increase the enlistment period and to fix it at a minimum of 12 months, or for the war. The total number of men employed during this war was 104,000. It was a brilliantly successful war, and to quote again from Upton, who is almost the sole authority from which we draw accurate data concerning our wars:

           “Successes are so brilliant would apparently denote the perfection of military policy, but, paradoxical as it may seem, official documents establish the fact that they were achieved under the very same system of laws and executive orders which in the preceding foreign war had led to a series of disasters culminating in the capture and destruction of our capital. 

           “The explanation of this paradox is to be found partly in the difference of character of our adversaries, but more especially in the quality of the Regular Army, with which we began the two wars. For the Mexican war, as for the war of 1812, the Government had ample time to prepare.”

           This quotation covers the situation very well. Our enemy was not a well prepared enemy, and the scene of action was so distant from the source from which troops were drawn that the troops were in hand for a long enough period to get them into fairly effective shape. There was an exceptionally efficient body of regular officers.

           Again there was a relatively small force of Militia employed — only 12,500 out of a force of 104,000, as compared with 458,000 out of a force of 521,000 in the war of 1812.

Lessons of the Civil War

We now come to the great Civil War. Our population was nearly 31,000,000. We had a small regular army scattered over a vast area. It numbered a little over 16,000 men. Some of it was west of the Mississippi; in fact, it was scattered from the Canadian border to the Mexican frontier, and drawn out in a thin line along our western frontier. We were unprepared as usual. Fortunately the seceding States were equally unprepared, and it was a case of two nations entering into war, both unprepared, and each having to develop its military resources in the way of men and material as the war went on. There is no doubt whatever in the mind of any intelligent student of military matters that had either side possessed a well organized and well disciplined force of 50,000 men, that side would have occupied the other’s capital almost immediately. 

           Dependence was placed upon both Militia and Volunteers. The Militia was unsatisfactory, as has generally been the case. The conduct of Governors was too often characterized by party affiliations. The political aspects of the war are too well known to require discussion. 

           The main dependence of the country was placed upon the Volunteers. This was true of both North and South, and in each instance it was necessary to go to the draft. The cost in blood and treasure was tremendous. Out of this military chaos eventually came two splendid armies — armies, however, created at tremendous cost.

           The old policy was adopted — first Militia and Volunteers, followed by the draft, bounties with their attendant evils, widespread desertion, bounty jumping, etc. Fortunately it was a struggle amongst ourselves. Had the country as a whole been attacked by a well organized nation of equal population, but with fully developed military resources, we could have looked for but one result. The lessons of all the above referred to wars point out very clearly to what our weakness has been due, namely, first — the lack of any adequate military preparation — second, dependence upon an unsound military policy, as indicated by the maintenance of an inadequate Regular Army, and dependence upon Militia and Volunteers; also failure to avail ourselves of the full military strength of the nation.

           Again quoting Upton: “Any Government which foregoes its rights to compulsory military service becomes more and more enslaved by depending solely upon voluntary military service, induced by gifts of money, land and clothing.”

Preparedness Without Militarism

The voluntary system failed us in the past, and will fail us in the future. It is uncertain in operation, prevents organized preparation, tends to destroy that individual sense of obligation for military service which should be found in every citizen, costs excessively in life and treasure, and does not permit that condition of preparedness which must exist if we are to wage war successfully with any great power prepared for war. The question is: “What shall we do to adequately prepare ourselves for war, without establishing a huge standing army or bringing about a condition which might be described as one of militarism, which term, as I use it, means the condition under which the military forces of a nation demand and secure special recognition, both socially and officially, and exercise an undue influence in the conduct of the civil affairs of the Government, both at home and abroad. In other words, a condition which may be described as one under which the military element dominates the nation’s policy. Nothing could be more unfortunate than the establishment of such a condition in this country or elsewhere, so far as development on normal lines is concerned. However, a condition of thorough preparedness can be established without creating a condition of militarism. Switzerland is an illustration of this possibility. Here we have a country noted for its patriotism, distinguished for conservatism and good government, with a people noted for intelligence, industry and good conduct, yet every man who is physically fit has, with few exceptions, received a sufficient amount of military training to fit him to be an efficient soldier.

           It has been accomplished in great part during his school period, and at camps of instruction during his youth, and so thorough and complete is the system that at the end of his school and other training received during this period it is only necessary to give him from two to three months’ intensive training in camp, according to the arm in which he is to serve, to fit him for the final discharge of his duties. The training for officers is, of course, extended over longer periods, but all of this training is accomplished without any interference worthy of consideration with the youth’s educational and industrial career. In fact, he is better physically, morally and better as a citizen, because of his training. He has learned to respect the flag of his country and to have a proper regard for the rights of others, and he has had built up in him an appreciation of his obligation to serve the country in time of war. He realizes that this is a tax on which all others depends, and on the payment of which in good faith the life of the nation itself rests.

Preparation Best Insurance for Peace

Australia has inaugurated a somewhat similar system, having in view the same general purpose; namely, the preparation of every male who is physically fit for military duty, Our situation, of course, differs from that of Switzerland, because we must maintain at all times a standing army adequate for the peace needs of the nation. By this I mean the garrison of the Panama Canal, Alaska and the oversea possessions; also a force within continental United States adequate to meet the needs of the country in the way of furnishing garrisons for the sea coast defenses and a sufficient mobile force to control internal disorders or to provide an expeditionary force for minor operations, such as those incident to the recent occupation of Cuba or Vera Cruz.

           The Swiss system costs about $6,500,000 a year. There can be no question of its benefit to the people from an economic standpoint, as well as from a military standpoint. The influence in bettering citizenship is shown in the criminal rate of Switzerland, which is only a small fraction of our own. We must adopt a system based on these general lines if we are ever to be efficiently prepared for war or, better said, prepared against war, for our preparation is really an insurance against war rather than an incentive to it. Do not place any dependence upon the statements of these charlatans who speak of a million men flocking to arms between sun and sun, but remember when you hear fallacies of this sort the words of old Light Horse Harry Lee, which are as true today as they were when they were uttered. We must preserve our ideals, strive for world peace, and do what we can to build up the adjustment of international difficulties through arbitration, but we must not fail to give due heed to the conditions under which we live. Whatever we may hope for in the way of universal peace does not justify us in disregarding conditions which surround us today. If we want to hand down to our children the heritage which has come to us from our fathers, we must not place confidence in idle boasting but give serious heed to well thought out preparation and adopt a policy for the future with reference to our military establishment very different from that which has existed in the past. We can do this without violating our ideals. If I were to state such a military policy I would say, briefly, have an Army sufficient for the peace needs of the nation, a good Militia, an adequate Navy, and behind them the largest possible number of men trained to be efficient soldiers if needs, but in time of peace following their ordinary civil occupations — ready to come when wanted. A country so prepared will have the largest possible measure of peace. 

* Copyright, 1915, Princeton University Press.

General Wood has here very kindly revised for publication in The Weekly, the address which he delivered at Princeton last spring in the course of military instruction. The increased interest in military preparedness and the great impetus given to the movement by the summer camps at Plattsburg, which were attended by so many Princeton men, and the success of which was so largely due to the cooperation of General Wood, give especial timeliness and importance to the views of such a distinguished military authority as the Commander of the Department of the East of the United States Army.

This was originally published in the October 27, 1915 issue of PAW.