Post-War Problems with the Second Great War

In the hope of throwing some light on the vast and difficult problems of post-war reconstruction, a round-table has been organized at Princeton made up of certain members of the University faculty plus representatives from the Institute for Advanced Study, the Princeton Theological Seminary and the League of Nations Economic and Financial Committee, now temporarily situated at Princeton.

           This group, numbering forty scholars, and presided over by Professor John B. Whitton, of the politics department (Professor Theodore M. Greene, philosophy, Frank D. Graham, economics, and Dana C. Munro, School of Public and International Affairs, are on the executive committee), is considering the main international post-war problems, including such vital questions as how to deal with Germany, the role of Soviet Russia and questions of re-education, relief and reconstruction. Its major problem, however, is the policy to be adopted by the United States after victory has been won.

           At a meeting held recently to consider this question, the members of the Princeton group reached general agreement on the following propositions:

           I. We heartily endorse Walter Lippmann’s advocacy (in his recent book, “United States Foreign Policy, Shield of the Republic”) of a clear recognition of a community of interest between this country and the British commonwealth of nations, in spite of the dubious interpretation of history and the somewhat specious reasoning with which he supports his position. Whether the recognition of this community of interest should be expressed in the form of a precisely defined alliance, rather than in some less formal understanding, is open to question.

           II. Granted the recognition of a community of interest between the United States and the British commonwealth of nations, it is of vital importance that Russia be brought within the scope of amicable understanding. 

           III. If, as we expect, the war ends in complete defeat of the Axis nations, then, in the foreseeable future, the Anglo-Saxon combination and the U.S.S.R will possess such overwhelming military might as to make challenging of them, acting in concert, a practically hopeless enterprise for any other power or group of powers. Conversely, no one of the victor powers, acting alone, could feel secure against some possible hostile coalition.

           IV. The world’s peace and security, in the foreseeable future, would therefore seem to depend on the maintenance of close cooperative relationships between the three great post-war powers. China is potentially, of course, also a great military power, and her actual contribution to the war effort must not be minimized. It seems unlikely, however, that she will be in a position, in our generation, to approach the military strength of Russia, the British commonwealth, or the United States, either on land or sea. These three must therefore bear the chief responsibility for peace. They should, however, cooperate as closely as possible with China both before and after the cessation of hostilities.

           V. There are no compelling reasons why any disputes that may arise between Russia, the British commonwealth, and the U.S.A. should lead to war. The Anglo-Saxon combination will possess overwhelming sea-power while Russia seems destined to be by far the strongest power in the center of the world’s principal land-mass. The old difficulty, noted by Bismarck, of an attack on the elephant by the whole, or vice-versa, will go far to prevent hostilities. Provided neither group is ambitious to become amphibious, no vital conflicts, therefore, are inherent in the situation. There is here a sort of natural balance, offering a favorable prospect for peace.

           VI. While amity between the United States, the British commonwealth and Russia would, in the foreseeable future, all but guarantee the prevention of anything like global war, such amity can be maintained only under that role of law. The three great post-war powers can be a nucleus of a peaceful world order, but a nucleus only. Unless other nations are brought into the structure on a free basis, that is, as possessors of equal rights in an all-embracing system, they seem certain to be storm centers of disputes between the major powers who will seek disparately to dominate them, or secure alliance with them, as “protection” against each other. This would be the fertile breeding ground of a new world war. 

This was originally published in the October 1, 1943 issue of PAW.