The University in National Defense
An industrial scientist describes the role, the record and some of the dangers of the university
Mr. Kelly is president of the Bell Telephone Laboratories and a member of Princeton’s Advisory Council to the Department of Electrical Engineering. Appearing here is the address he gave at the Alumni Luncheon on Feb. 19. It has been slightly shortened for reasons of space.
In the fifteen years since the nation initiated an all-out effort in building military strength, science and technology, through the operations of military research and development, have revolutionized warfare. The military might of a people is no longer measured in manpower alone. It is primarily dependent on the strength and competence of its scientific and technical community and its industrial productive capacity. It is for this reason that the Russians are giving top priority to science and technology and the building of heavy industry.
Military research and development, through the size and scope of the program, are perhaps the most dynamic force in our society. The resultant new scientific and technical knowledge is the foundation for our continuously growing military strength. A constant flow of ever more effective new weapons is the material manifestation of accomplishment.
Within a period of less than ten years, the blast destructive power of atomic weapons has increased a thousandfold — from 20 thousand to 20 million equivalent tons of TNT. Military planes now fly three times as fast and high as at the close of World War II. In the defense of our cities from enemy planes and missiles, a highly accurate supersonic electronically guided missile, with a ceiling higher than 60,000 feet and a devastating kill potential replaces the anti-aircraft artillery shell of less than 20,000-foot ceiling, limited accuracy and kill power. These are typical of the weapons advances that are taking place in every sector of warfare.
The inherent effectiveness of these weapons, their production in quantities adequate for equipping a three million man military force, and their effective integration into the tactics and strategy of warfare, combine to give us the greatest military might ever possessed by a single nation. Without doubt, it is this position of strength, coupled with our determination to employ it in preserving our freedom, that has kept the world free from a major war these past ten years.
Military research and development has, therefore, been highly successful in building military strength, the mission that is its justification. It is also having far reaching effects on the nation in its non-military economy, in its industrial strength, and in the lives and culture of its people. These indirect or by-product effects and the direct contributions to warfare, combine to make military research and development a force of very broad significance to our society.
The University in War
The university, industry, and the military are partners in carrying out the military research and development. The university’s contribution is most significant. Today and for the past fifteen years, no other element of our society could fill the role the university plays.
In 1940, when the nation turned from its path of peace to building military strength, the men of the university brought to the President’s attention the importance of science to warfare — to new weapons systems. They pointed out the possibility of military use of the power of the atomic nucleus that is released through fission, and urged that there be an organized scientific effort across the forefront of the physical sciences directed at revolutionary new weaponry. The President responded; the National Defense Research Corporation, followed by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, was organized. A majority of its directorate were men of the university. There was only one industrial member, Dr. F. B. Jewett, then President of Bell Laboratories. Most of the work of more than a dozen sections of this office was done in universities.
This civilian and heavily academic organization reported directly to the President and cooperated with the armed forces on a coordinate basis. The military was not equipped to initiate or to manage basic science programs directed at revolutionary new weapons. Their research and development funds had been limited since the close of World War I. Their research and development budget in 1938 was only some $25 million. They did not have an organization or individuals in adequate number competent to act as the nucleus around which an all-out national effort for applying forefront scientific knowledge to weaponry could be organized. [Essentially the same was true of] our industrial research laboratories. The responsibility for applying science in warfare, therefore, fell heavily on the university. It was uniquely indicated for this task.
By the close of the war, our nation was superior or equal to the Germans in almost all areas of weaponry. Completely new and powerful instrumentalities of warfare, including the atomic bomb, never dreamed of before 1940, were brought into being, and employed in combat by our armed forces. Without doubt, the new warfare made possible by the new weapons insured victory, shortened the war, and saved the lives of countless American boys. This was an amazing accomplishment, especially when one takes into account the low status of weaponry and the small amount of our weaponry research and development effort in the years preceding the war in contrast with the very large effort of the Germans throughout the 1930’s. The university and its men deserve a large portion of the credit.
Withdrawal and Return
In 1946, the nation quickly demobilized its armed forces and cut back civilian effort in all areas of military support. Military research and development decreased from a $1.5 billion annual level to $.8 billion. The OSRD was disbanded and the university decreased its military research and development effort more than 300 percent in comparison to the 50 per cent reduction of the total. This was indicated as best from two points of view. The university should be available for all-out military contribution in a period of “hot” or all-out war; but in non-war time its attention to the military area should be the minimum possible. It should then do only those tasks in research and development for which it is uniquely qualified. Its withdrawal from leadership of the programs also afforded opportunity for the military and the new Atomic Energy Commission to take over the responsibility of initiation and direction…
The Korean incident and the nation’s growing awareness of the long range determination of the Russian Communist regime to engulf the world, led to a large expansion of military research and development by the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission beginning in 1951. The level increased from $1.2 billion in 1951 to about $1.9 billion at the present. There is every indication that, except for a major intensification of the Russian Communist threat, the level has stabilized. We may expect an indefinite continuation at this very high level. The research and development for the civilian economy is at about a $2 billion level and can be expected to increase at perhaps a five per cent per year rate.
With the military research and development level almost doubling in the 1951-55 period over the level of the immediate post-war period 1946-50, the university participation in the program has greatly increased. A civilian organization such as the wartime OSRD was not established although it was seriously considered. The university participates through contract with the Department of Defense and the AEC.
The distribution of effort in the military research and development program among the university, industry and the government establishments of the Department of Defense and the AEC, on an annual basis is currently (in millions of dollars):
University $225 — 12%
Industry $975 —51%
Government Establishments $700 —37%
The large expansion of university participation in the program in the post-Korean period was required if the most effective elements of the nation’s strength were to be employed. In the immediate post-war period, a major portion of the basic research was done by the university. As the seat of the nation’s greatest strength in basic research, it was clearly the responsibility of the university to continue this portion of its wartime burden. Basic research shared to some extent in the post-Korean expanded program, so the university’s basic research participation increased. Applied research and development were even more largely expanded. The university and industry were the two organizations in the national framework best suited to this expansion.
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the new laboratories of the Department of Defense in science and technology has not, in general, advanced to a level approaching that of the university and industry. There is a complex of reasons for this. Basically, it has not been possible to establish the environment and atmosphere in these laboratories essential to creative science and technology. An adequate number of highly creative scientists and engineers cannot be retained in the military laboratories. Civil Service controls, level of compensation and military administration of the establishments are major factors. The outlook for early improvement is not good. It is, therefore, most important that the creative portions of the research and development program be largely done by the university and industry.
Effects on the University
Earlier we spoke of the inability of the military in 1940 to assume the burden of initiation and management of the new application of science to weaponry programs. This inability is a matter of degree, for the university, even though the place in the nation best suited to the task, was also ill-prepared for this large responsibility.
We are a very young nation. In 1940 the university had not attained a balanced development. The graduate school, the home of research in the university, was especially immature. There was little participation in physical science research by our universities in 1900.
In 1915, when I made the choice of a university for graduate work in physics, there were only four where the graduate instruction and research in physics were comparable in quality to those of most universities of Europe. Princeton was one of the four. There was a slow growth in number and improvement in quality through the years; until in 1940, the number was perhaps fifteen, certainly not twenty.
The dollar volume of the universities’ research in the physical sciences in 1938 was less than $30 million. Its level of applied research and development was still less. However, there was a reservoir of able and well-trained men at many of our colleges, technical schools, and universities who were capable of doing good research. Inadequate funds, lack of facilities, and heavy teaching loads prevented their participation.
These men were drawn into the OSRD programs, and their institutions provided with the essential facilities. Our creative science and technical strength was thus multiplied severalfold during the war years. This expansion, accompanied by an ever-improving level of quality, has continued to this day.
The research and development effort in science and technology in the academic institutions and non-profit foundations is now at an annual level of some $400 million, an almost tenfold increase since 1938. More than half is sponsored by the military. At present, the AEC has some 300 research contracts in the physical sciences with ninety universities. The annual expenditure is some $20 million. These contracts provide employment for some 1600 graduate students in the fields of mathematics, physics, chemistry, chemical engineering, and metallurgy. Five hundred will receive Ph.D’s or Master’s degrees this year. In the life sciences, including medicine, biophysics, biology, and agriculture, approximately 390 research contracts are now active at 184 universities, hospitals and research institutions. Under these contracts, about 320 graduate students are given full-time or part-time employment.
The total volume of military sponsored research and development in the university is about five times that of the AEC. Approximately 5,000 young men are in these programs. Their graduate training is largely financed by their work in the program. The university departments involved are greatly strengthened by their participation, the advances in weaponry resulting from these programs increases our military strength, and much of the scientific and technical knowledge gained is of direct benefit to the civilian economy. These are the larger benefits to our society of the university participation in the military research and development programs.
Effect on Civilian Economy
The basic technology of weaponry and many of the facilities of the civilian economy have much in common. Research and development findings in one area often have application in the other. The huge military research and development effort of the past fifteen years has provided new technology in large volume that has direct application to the civilian economy. The military programs have thus in effect increased the volume of the nation’s scientific and technologic effort directed at the civilian economy. For the fifteen years, the military research and development expenditures have been $18 billion and that for the civilian economy $20 billion.
The combined output of new scientific and technical knowledge from these two programs — military and civilian — has established a tempo of building industrial strength, raising the standard of living and adding to the material comforts of all our citizens never before approached by any nation of the world.
Advancing the date of introduction into the civilian economy of new materials and new facilities is one of the larger contributions of military development programs to the civilian area. The times of introduction are advanced in periods ranging from a few years to a few decades. This acceleration comes about in large part due to the emphasis that may be placed on a specific area of science or technology where a military application of importance is indicated. A development that gives promise of large contribution in weaponry or that insures against an inadequate supply of a strategic material, for example, may be given almost unlimited financial support. This selective support by government of such specific items is often at levels so far in excess of what would be sound for industry in a normal peacetime economy, that new materials and facilities are made available years in advance of the time likely under normal peacetime conditions.
The nation’s development of atomic weapons is an outstanding example. … The importance of the metal titanium to the military airplane has justified huge expenditures for quickly mastering its metallurgy and the reduction of its refinement and fabrication costs. It will be available for civilian uses many, many years sooner because of this stimulation.
Coming Era of Automation
Digital computation for a variety of military purposes, in guidance of missiles, radar bombsights, fire-control systems and solution of many complex problems in atomic weapons and aerodynamics led to large expenditures for research in mathematics and physics directed at creating electronic computers — the so-called “electronic brains.” The technology of such computers and of their solid state components, derived in part from military research and development, has spearheaded a major technical development popularly known as “automation.”
Relieving man and beast of heavy muscular toil by the utilization of power through “mechanization” has had profound social and economic effects on our people. We have led the world in this development. It has been the most important single element in our industrial supremacy and in our high standard of living. The social and economic effects of “automation” through digital processes in relieving man from routine mental and light physical tasks in industry and in business will have an impact on our society of comparable scope.
The impact in the years ahead on the university of the application to our industrial and business world of such developments as atomic energy and “automation” will be very large. The entrance of these new technologies into our national life will greatly increase the demand for men trained in the physical sciences and engineering. The ratio of the scientists and engineer to the worker in industry and business has steadily increased; the tempo of this trend will rise. Science and engineering in the university must occupy even a larger place if the demands are to be met.
For example, the AEC has recently stated that the 18,000 scientists and engineers now in the Atomic Energy program must be increased to at least 40,000 in the next twenty years. To achieve this goal, the university output of scientists and engineers of the types required in the program must be increased from the present annual level of 1,500 to 4,000 by 1975.
The Threat of Materialism
This may well have ill effects as well as the desirable ones described, both for our society and for the university. Time does not permit an orderly discussion of the ill effects. They center around the effects on our culture of over-emphasis of the material side of our life. In the university, the arts and the areas of science not involved in military research and development are not receiving support in balance with those areas of military interest. They are relatively undernourished. Correspondingly in our society, because of the heavy tax burden entailed by our huge defense program, many areas essential to our cultural welfare are receiving inadequate support. A typical example is the shortage of elementary and secondary school housing. The United States Office of Education estimates that the nation is short some 345,000 elementary and secondary school classrooms.
The relative overemphasis of the “material” in our society today, occasioned by the necessary high level of military preparedness effort, presents most serious long-term dangers to our society. Unless we correct this imbalance, as a people we may be like the man who, over the years, devotes all of his energies to accumulating wealth for later enjoyment of life only to find, too late, that even with the acquired wealth he has not the capacities for enjoyment. So can we, as a people, direct our energies so exclusively to preserving our freedoms that too late we discover that we have become a different kind of people and lost our capacity for enjoying the freedom and the rich cultural life that is our heritage.
Princeton’s “Noble Part”
Princeton has played its part — a noble part — in the nation’s military research and development programs. True to its general aim, Princeton has been in the nation’s service in military research and development. There are now some eighty military research and development projects in the different departments of the University. Some $3 million will be expanded on them this year. They are in support of the work of every military department and the AEC.
The Advisory Councils of the various departments with their membership of alumni and friends of the University, chosen from the academic, industrial and business life of the nation, are rendering a great service to the University and to the nation in aiding the departments to develop balanced educational and research programs that are well coordinated with the changing needs of our society in this critical period. As a friend of the University, I enjoy my participation in the work of the Visiting Committee of the Electrical Engineering Department. I count the time given as, not only in the University’s service, but also in the service of the nation.
This was originally published in the March 11, 1955 issue of PAW.
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